

## **Post-Afghanistan syndrome? Canadian public opinion on military intervention abroad after the Afghanistan mission**

**By Mathieu Landriault, University of Ottawa**

*(DRAFT ONLY – PLEASE DO NOT CITE WITHOUT AUTHOR’S PERMISSION)*

For over more than a decade, the mission in Afghanistan dominated public and scholarly debates on the role that Canada should play in the world. Originally, the Kabul-based deployment focused on providing security and overseeing the preparation for a democratic election. It gathered robust support in the Canadian populace as the mission “resembled later-generation peacekeeping missions – in other words, the CF were monitoring and enforcing peace rather than engaging in larger combat operations” (Murray and McCoy, 2010, p.178).

The issue has been one of the most contested and divisive case in which Canada used force abroad. The beginning of the combat mission in Kandahar during the summer of 2006 marked a turning point, although mounting casualties could only partially explain heightened opposition (Boucher, 2010). Partisan politics certainly played a significant role, with federal political parties jockeyed to assert their positions in two successive minority governments. This configuration of power resulted in parliamentary debates in 2006 and 2008 to decide on possible extensions to the Afghan mission.

Ultimately, the end of the combat mission in 2011 put the Afghan case on the back burner, with only 950 Canadian Forces (CF) personnel left, fulfilling the lower-key mandate of training local Afghan troops. Public sentiments were not kind in assessing the relevance of the Afghan campaign. In an Angus Reid poll conducted in January 2012, 40% of respondents thought that Canada had made a mistake by sending military forces to Afghanistan in 2002, while only 36% thought that the country had done the right thing. Moreover, 65% disagreed with the statement that “Afghanistan will never again become a safe haven for international terrorism”, while 69% disagreed with the statement that “The war of Afghanistan was worth the human and financial toll” (Angus Reid, 2012).

Of course, public opinion does not systematically determine decisions taken by any government: the Afghan campaign is a case in point, Canada remaining in Afghanistan until 2014. However, it can at times act as a powerful factor shaping the policy environment, providing incentives or disincentives for decision-makers to adopt specific policies. High levels of pessimism about the accomplishments of the Canadian mission in Afghanistan call for an investigation of public opinion trends for subsequent missions. The question, put simply, is straightforward: what level

of support can one observe for the use of force abroad by the Canadian government in the post-Afghan context<sup>1</sup>?

In order to proceed with such an inquiry, 26 opinion polls<sup>2</sup> from February 2013 to April 2017 were gathered for the purpose of this analysis. These surveys can inform our understanding of public preferences in the post-Afghan environment. The polls dealt with three specific conflicts (Mali, Ukraine, anti-Islamic State mission), although a majority of polls focused on one mission in particular: the anti-IS mission. This study will focus on support for peacekeeping by mainly analysing data from an Angus Reid poll conducted in September 2015. This specific poll is particularly interesting as it is one of few inquiries to question respondents on peacekeeping. Additionally, it assessed support for peacekeeping in comparison to various attitudinal variables.

### Of intervention and isolation

The first potential repercussion of the Afghan mission could have been to erode the legitimacy of intervening abroad. An initial glance at the data reported in table 1 (below) can certainly provide support for this hypothesis, especially when focusing on the March and September 2015 Angus Reid polls.

Theater of operation	Support for non-interventionism	Dates of inquiry	Polling firm
Mali	11% (5)	Jan. 31-Feb.4 2013	Harris Decima
Ukraine	15% (4)	Apr. 29-30 2014	Angus Reid
Ukraine	20% (7)	Aug. 18-19 2014	Forum Research
Anti-Islamic State	23% (3)	Sept. 17-19 2014	Angus Reid
Anti-IS	44% (2)	Mar. 11-12 2015	Angus Reid
Anti-IS	39% (2)	Sep. 22-24 2015	Angus Reid
Anti-IS	9% (4)	Nov. 18 2015	Angus Reid
Anti-IS	9% (6)	Jan. 30-Feb 1 2016	Nanos Research

Table 1: Surveys from polling firms offering a non-interventionist choice of answer. The number of choices of answers provided to respondents are in brackets next to the percentages.


However, both these opinion polls confronted participants with a binary decision to either extend the current mission, or to end it altogether. Percentages are typically higher when providing only 2 options. The questions asked in the March 2015 Angus Reid provides interesting insights into this phenomenon. On a first question, respondents had to pick between two options: whether to end (44%) or extend (56%) the Canadian mission against ISIS. Later on, participants were presented with three choices of answers in the case of a possible mission expansion: to stick to training and bombing only, to get involved on the ground or to not get involved at all. Support for the non-interventionist option fell from 44% to 28% (Angus Reid, 2015). This 16% gap can be explained by isolating subjects that agreed with the non-interventionist answer in the first

<sup>1</sup> The end of the combat mission (2011) will be used to mark the start of the post-Afghan environment as the Afghanistan file faded from the political radar once the combat has been terminated.

<sup>2</sup> These polls were conducted by many different polling firms based in Canada. These are: Abacus Data, Angus Reid Institute, EKOS, Forum Research, Harris Decima, Ipsos and Nanos Research.

question and focusing on their answer to the subsequent mission expansion question (see figure 1).

**Now, this coming week the federal government will put a motion before Parliament to extend Canada's mission for another six months. In your opinion, do you think the Canadian Parliament should vote:: To end the Canadian mission against ISIS**



**So far, the US is using air strikes against ISIS and supporting allies involved in direct combat there - but the US has not engaged in direct military involvement on the ground. If the US were to expand their mission to include active combat on the ground,**

Figure 1: results from an Angus Reid poll conducted in March 2015.

Support for non-interventionism erodes when more than two options are suggested to respondents. Indeed, 16% of participants who answered they would end the mission against ISIS opted for a continuation of the air bombing campaign combined with training local troops. 60% of these respondents thought that Canada's involvement against ISIS would make it more dangerous in Canada and 45% did not believe that force will be successful in defeating ISIS: an air and training campaign is a default policy choice but not perceived as efficient by many Canadians.

Then, only 60% of respondents who preferred ending the current Canadian mission can be considered true non-interventionist, displaying a coherent and consistent opinion. It also highlights the preference for bombing and training options over a ground campaign (more on this later).

When analysing non-interventionism for the anti-IS operation, one finds that support for this idea was surprisingly high (23%) before the deployment began. Nonetheless, non-interventionism did

not endure: such sentiments declined as the mission progressed<sup>3</sup>. Non-interventionist sentiments were also popular during the Ukrainian crisis but the nature of the enemy explains these high levels of support for isolation: the great power status of Russia seemed to convince many Canadians that this was not a realistic fight for a middle power like Canada.

A second potential effect of the Afghan mission could have been to discredit the option of sending troops on the ground in foreign countries to participate in robust operations involving combat. In the case of Afghanistan, a mean of 40% of Canadians supported the operation from 2006 to 2009 (Kreps, 2010, p.195), with a mean of 35% supporting the mission at the end of 2010 (Ringmose and Borgesen, 2011, p.508). Consequently, it seems credible to hypothesize that the outcome of such a long and unpopular deployment could have been to render unpopular sending ground troops abroad in a combat mission.

Deployments of ground operation received appreciable support although the theaters of intervention greatly influenced results, as can be seen in table 1. For example, only 19% of respondents in a Harris-Decima poll conducted in early 2013 supported sending Canadian armed troops in Mali to fight the jihadists (Harris Decima, 2013).

Theater of operation	Support for ground intervention	Dates of inquiry	Polling firm
Mali	19%	Jan. 31-Feb.4 2013	Harris Decima
Anti-Islamic State (IS)	21%	Mar. 11-12, 2015	Angus Reid
Anti-IS	40%	Mar. 18-25 2015	EKOS
Anti-IS	69%	Feb. 9-12 2015	Ipsos
Anti-IS	65%	Mar. 16-19 2015	Ipsos
Anti-IS	62%	Nov. 17-19 2015	Ipsos
Anti-IS	47%	Nov. 21-24 2015	Nanos Research
Anti-IS	43%	Nov. 23-25 2015	Abacus Data
Anti-IS	72%	July 27-29 2016	Ipsos

Table 2: Surveys from polling firms questioning respondents on support for ground operation abroad by Canadian troops.

Polls conducted asking respondents their opinions on possible ground missions were relatively rare, polling firms concentrating on support or opposition to existing policies (bombing and training for the most part). Additionally, data is rather inconclusive as four polls (the four Ipsos polls) showed overwhelming support for ground combat, while participants opposing it represented a plurality in the EKOS and Nanos Research surveys. The ground troop approach also took the back seat to another military option (training local troops and/or bombing) in the Harris Decima, Angus Reid and Abacus Data inquiries. Although this strategy was not disqualified outright by Canadians, it did not gather systematic and clear support from the Canadian populace.

Additional data has been gathered for another offensive military option: air bombing (see table 3).

<sup>3</sup> Terrorist attacks, at home and abroad, sponsored or claimed by the Islamic State group can also partially explain low levels of non-interventionism.

Theater of operation	Support for air bombing	Dates of inquiry	Polling firm
Anti-Islamic State	64%	Sep. 30-Oct.1 2014	Ipsos
Anti-IS	66%	Nov. 19-20 2014	Forum Research
Anti-IS	63%	Jan. 27-28 2015	Forum Research
Anti-IS	76%	Feb. 9-12 2015	Ipsos
Anti-IS	56%	Mar. 11-12 2015	Angus Reid
Anti-IS	65%	Mar. 16-19 2015	Ipsos
Anti-IS	52%	Mar. 18-25 2015	EKOS
Anti-IS	61%	Sep. 22-24 2015	Angus Reid
Anti-IS	48%	Oct. 26-29 2015	Angus Reid
Anti-IS	51%	Nov. 17 2015	Forum Research
Anti-IS	68%	Nov. 17-19 2015	Ipsos
Anti-IS	59%	Nov. 21-24 2015	Nanos Research
Anti-IS	29%	Jan. 30-Feb. 1 2016	Nanos Research
Anti-IS	28%	Feb. 16-17 2016	Forum Research

Table 3: opinion polls tracking support among Canadians for the participation of Canada to an air bombing campaign.

Fourteen polls questioned respondents on the initiation or continuation of a bombing campaign. Support remained high through the end of 2014 and up until the end of 2015, with a mean support of 61% and a peak of 76% from September 2014 to November 2015. These twelve polls asked respondents whether they supported or opposed the current air bombing campaign in which Canada was participating. It is fair to say that this offensive military policy enjoyed a high level of social approbation, with air bombing consistently gathering more support than a ground troop campaign. For example, three Ipsos polls (February, March and November 2015) stand out as respondents were overwhelmingly supportive of ground operations and bombing campaigns. Support for an air bombing campaign prevailed over a ground campaign by an average of 4%.

Support dropped in the October 2015 Angus Reid poll with a majority of respondents agreeing with ending the bombing campaign mission against ISIS. However, it is difficult to conclude anything from this particular poll: the question asked subjects if they would support the implementation of Justin Trudeau's campaign promise. Hence, support for ending the mission is intermingled with agreement that politicians must follow through and keep their words.

These surveys must be put in context. They surveyed respondents if they supported statements enouncing the possibility of sending Canadian armed troops in combat operations on the ground to fight against IS. As such, these questions did not present respondents with trade-offs, or presented combat operation alongside other options. Realistically, public debates and partisan positioning usually present citizens with many possible policy options. As such, when participants were asked to indicate their preference among many options (the polls done by Angus Reid and Abacus data in table 1 for example), mean support for a ground operation dropped at 36%. A similar observation can be made for the air bombing campaign. The last 2 polls in table 3 were the only ones asking respondents for their preferred approach fighting IS: the mean of support for a bombing campaign dropped at 29%.

An Ipsos poll conducted in November 2015 can provide an explanation for this variation. While 68% agreed that “to the use of Canadian Forces Fighter Jets in the international coalition’s airstrikes against ISIS targets in Iraq and Syria”, 52% agreed that Prime Minister Trudeau should stay committed to his campaign promise to remove Canadian CF-18 jets from the airstrike mission against ISIS targets in Iraq and Syria (Ipsos, 2015). Thus, support for the air bombing campaign remained volatile, especially when presented with the option to put more emphasis on training local troops. A Forum Research poll conducted in February 2016 saw 48% of support (while 36% opposed) for the change of mission implemented by the Trudeau government (end of bombing campaign, increase of military personnel involved in training). Crucially, this change of policy was approved by a plurality of individuals who had voted for all parties (with the exception of the Conservatives) at the 2015 federal election (Forum Research, 2016).

Training local troops gathered more support from respondents than other military options in 4 out of 5 polls, while coming to a close second in the other (see table 4).

Theater of operation	Support for training local troops	Support for other military options	Dates of inquiry	Polling firm
Mali	28%	Ground: 19%	Jan. 31-Feb.4 2013	Harris Decima
Anti-Islamic State	38%	Ground: 28%	Sept. 17-19 2014	Angus Reid
Anti-IS	57%	Ground: 43%	Nov. 23-25 2015	Abacus Data
Anti-IS	38%	Air: 29%	Jan. 30- Feb. 1 2016	Nanos Research
Anti-IS	27%	Air: 28%	Feb. 16-17 2016	Forum Research

Table 4: surveys offering training local troops as a choice of answer among other military options.

Efficacy of force may prove to be a defining measure for support to use force abroad, especially for attitudes related to perceived efficacy of air bombing to defeat the enemy. For example, in a survey conducted by Abacus Data in December 2015, 55% believed that “air bombing is unlikely to be effective at destroying ISIS”. As such, air bombing campaigns had shortcomings that could only be remedied through ground operations, which were perceived as more effective; the option of training foreign troops to conduct these operations (57%) was preferred to the alternative of Canadians directly intervening (43%) (Abacus Data, 2015).

The preference for training local troops does not come as a surprise. Even at the end of the long and contested mission in Afghanistan, a strong majority of Canadians (54% for, 39% against) were in favour of the training mission in Afghanistan from 2011 to 2014 (Angus Reid, 2012). In the post-Afghanistan context, defensive (training local troops) and offensive (bombing, ground combat) militarism seems a less relevant distinction than first expected. The main driver of public attitudes appears to be the level of danger associated with specific deployments, with less casualty-prone options receiving more public support. This illustrates that the option of training local troops arrived at the top of the list of Canadian preferences, followed by an air bombing campaign and, in third position, a ground operation. However, it is important to note that a ground campaign gathered surprisingly high levels of support.

Important limitations render generalizing these observations a perilous enterprise. First, access to individual-level data is still difficult, rendering arduous more refined analysis of polls results. More importantly, most polls related to the use of force abroad conducted in the post-Afghanistan context addressed one specific mission: the anti-IS operation. The Islamic State organization represented an exceptional threat to the world, as it rapidly gained ground in Syria and Iraq, constituting a threat to regional and international security. Moreover, the group sponsored or claimed numerous terrorist attacks that took place in Canada as well as in allied countries, capturing Canadian and international attention. It will be interesting to analyse if the enthusiasm observed in relation to the anti-IS mission is carried over to other Canadian military involvements abroad. The Mali, Ukraine and anti-IS missions did not allow polling firms to focus on a traditionally popular option for external intervention among the Canadian populace: peacekeeping.

### **The missing piece: peacekeeping**

The importance of peacekeeping in governmental practices and discourses has recently been evolving. The arrival in power of the Conservative Party of Canada (CPC) in 2006 has marked a change of tone in Canada's international policy. A cornerstone of this new approach was to redefine Canada's stance towards the use of force abroad. According to Paris (2014),

“Prime Minister Harper has seemed determined to displace and delegitimize liberal internationalism and to replace it with the “courageous warrior” tradition. Practices such as peacekeeping, conflict resolution, norm-building and multilateral diplomacy have not featured in this narrative”.

Emphasis from this standpoint was on Canada's participation to war and peace enforcement missions rather than on multilateral operations such as peacekeeping or peacebuilding. This combatant identity, coupled with the endorsement of a “Manichean conception of the world, with the “good” found on one side and the “bad” on the other” (Massie and Roussel, 2013, p.46), contrasted with previous approaches. The objective was “to break with a past in Canadian foreign policy that is seen as deeply Liberal (Nossal 2013, p.23). Moral clarity tended to discard multilateralism (generally speaking) and the United Nations (UN) more specifically. Peacekeeping operations as stated previously came under attack as a clear manifestation of ineffective and even immoral multilateral engagement. As Staring (2013) argued,

“In Harper’s eyes, the chief legacy of Pearson and his successors in government is a nation that lacks the courage to stand and fight, precisely because it does not know what it stands for”.

However, these attacks must be put into perspective. Canadian involvement in peacekeeping has been declining since the second half of the 1990s. Indeed, before 2006, Canada was only participating in a handful of United Nations peace operations. As of 2005, 325 personnel constituted Canada's contribution to all UN missions (Dorn, 2005, p.23). The quasi abandonment by Canada of UN peacekeeping missions predates the election of the first Conservative government. However, it must be stressed that peacekeeping endured as an alternative policy

defended by opposition parties, Liberals and New Democrats alike, during the years of Conservative rule.

The Liberals voiced a strong commitment to peacekeeping during the 2015 electoral campaign, wanting to reengage the country in these types of operations. The election of Donald Trump and the resulting uncertainty about American intentions yielded a period of hesitation and delays in announcing Canada's own intentions as far as military involvements were concerned. If peacekeeping endured as an idea in partisan politics, the same can be said about its persistence in public opinion. Different studies have concluded that it still gathers great popular support (Dorn, 2005; Roussel and Boucher, 2008: p.175-177), although signs of a modest decline has been observed in recent years. For example, the percentage of Canadians citing peacekeeping as Canada's most positive contribution to the world dropped steadily from 2004 to 2012. However, the peacekeeping option has remained the most common response to the question (Paris, 2014: p.289-291). The Canadian Elections Survey (CES) provides additional evidence of a persisting allegiance. A strong majority of Canadians agreed that "Canada should participate in peacekeeping operations abroad even if it puts the lives of Canadians at risk": 80% supported this statement in the 2004 CES, 79% in 2008 and 2011 (Canadian Election Survey, 2017).

A recent Nanos Research poll confirmed the enduring popularity of peacekeeping. Indeed, 74% of respondents qualified the use of Canadian military resources in United Nations peacekeeping missions as "good" or "very good". Much in the same vein, 69% of Canadians support "deploying Canadian Forces personnel to areas where fighting is still active as United Nations peacekeepers" (Nanos Research, 2016).

Hence, peacekeeping has kept a relatively privileged status in public preferences even though Canadian troops did not participate in a significant fashion to any such mission in decades. As such, this study cannot evaluate levels of support for specific peacekeeping deployments and generate comparative insights with the data presented in the first section. Peacekeeping is also part of the myths and imagery shared by many Canadians when comes time to describe Canada's international identity. However, at the general idea level, the term may mean different things for different people: many different interpretations can be associated with the term "peacekeeping".

An Angus Reid poll conducted in September 2015 can partially address this shortcoming. This particular survey was performed during the 2015 electoral campaign, and focused on questions related to Canadian foreign policy. It is also one of the only polls in recent years that has produced a question on peacekeeping. A glance at results highlights strong support for peacekeeping. The Angus Reid Institute asked respondents whether the Canadian military should focus on peacekeeping or on combat preparedness. Overall, 74% chose peacekeeping while only 24% preferred combat preparedness. Peacekeeping gathered overwhelming support from respondents that had voted for all parties except the Conservatives, from 84% for Liberal supporters to 96% for Bloc supporters.

A focus on other questions complexify the overall portrait. Indeed, if Canadians are generally highly supportive of peacekeeping, it does not mean that they oppose specific combat missions.

As can be seen in figure 2, support for peacekeeping was less coherent than it was for combat preparedness in the case of the anti-ISIS mission.




Figure 2: Support for peacekeeping or combat and opinions on whether to extend or end the mission against ISIS.

A majority of respondents who preferred peacekeeping over combat in general acquiesced to extending the combat mission against ISIS. The same cannot be said for supporters of combat preparedness: only a small minority of individuals expressing support for combat preparedness elected to end the anti-ISIS campaign.

Additionally, the analysis of other questions is required to detect whether the support for peacekeeping owed more to the imagery tied to the term or to deep, principled attachment. As such, peacekeeping has been conceptualized as a practice inherently associated with internationalist principles, more precisely liberal internationalism. A liberal internationalist vision entails support for concrete actions such as peacekeeping, promotion of human rights, fairness in trade relationships and a commitment to development aid, all in order to better the international community and create a just international order (Boucher, 2013, p.59; Landriault, 2016, p.251). Can one observe support for such ideas alongside peacekeeping?

Overall, respondents who selected peacekeeping are more inclined than those who preferred combat preparedness to increase foreign aid contributions to 0.7% of the Gross National Income

(30% VS 13%), to accept Syrian refugees (76% VS 59%) and to consider fighting against human rights abuses in other countries a priority (20% VS 8%). Nonetheless, this contrasted picture does not hide the fact that agreement with a liberal internationalist practice such as peacekeeping does not correlate with other liberal internationalist priorities. For example, 20% of respondents who favored peacekeeping also expressed that they would prefer the Government of Canada do nothing about the Syrian refugee crisis. Moreover, 70% of these same respondents did not want the budget devoted to international aid to increase. Additionally, a majority of them (57%) placed “building better trade ties with international partners” at the top of their foreign policy priorities, far ahead from “being a leader in foreign aid and humanitarian causes” (38%), favoring an economic internationalist worldview over a liberal one (Angus Reid, 2015a).

An important reason to support peacekeeping might well be found in a question where individuals were asked to assess whether Canada’s reputation was better or worse in 2015 than it was in 2005. At this, 48% of peacekeeping supporters assessed that Canada’s international reputation was worse off than it was 2005. Although a retreat from peacekeeping was not the only foreign policy decision made during Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s tenure, the promotion of a warrior image was central in the conservative reengineering of the country’s international policy.

## **Conclusion**

The fact that Canada did not participate (or hasn’t yet) to any peacekeeping mission limits the observations one can generate about public support for such interventions abroad. Approval is usually lower for specific peacekeeping missions than it is for peacekeeping in general (Martin and Fortmann, 1995; Roussel and Boucher, 2008). Furthermore, the question about peacekeeping analyzed in the previous section frames it in a specific way, presenting it in a dichotomy with combat preparedness. The evolution of peacekeeping missions in recent years does not allow for such a non-violent description: the use of force is now an intricate part of peacekeeping missions, especially when considering the possibility of robust peacekeeping mission deployments.

Practices about the use of force abroad have a tendency to evolve and to adapt to new environments, while the perceptions of them do not. The same can be said about the favored option in combat missions, which is the training of local troops. This practice has emerged out of a peacebuilding approach, emphasizing on the security sector reform of post-conflict societies (see Jackson, 2011 for example). However, in recent years, training local troops has been a default solution implemented in societies tackling with insurgencies. It has also allowed Canadian troops to partake less in combat while reducing costs for politicians due to the low risks associated with such deployments.

Public support during the mission against ISIS has remained surprisingly stable. As the training mission was extended until March 2019, other operations may well be announced by the federal government. Peacekeeping may be reactivated if government follows through on the foreign policy speech delivered by Minister Chrystia Freeland this past June. It will be interesting to track the evolution of public opinion on any new deployment abroad. So far, the anti-ISIS

mission has received an exceptional amount of support from the Canadian populace; any new mission abroad is bound to have lower levels of approval.

## References

Abacus Data. 2015. What do Canadians think should be done about ISIS?. Press release, December 9 2015, available at <http://abacusdata.ca/what-do-canadians-think-should-be-done-about-isis/>

Angus Reid. 2015. ISIS Mission: Canadians tilt slightly towards extending involvement against Islamic State. Press release, March 23 2015, available at <http://angusreid.org/isis-mission-extension/>

Angus Reid. 2015a. Election 2015: Canadians profess decline in international reputation in last decade by margin of 2:1. Press release, September 28 2015, available at <http://angusreid.org/election-2015-foreign-policy/>

Angus Reid. 2012. Canadians Support Non-Combat Role for Troops in Afghanistan. Press release, February 2 2012.

Boucher, J.C. 2013. The Responsibility to Think Clearly about Interests: Stephen Harper's Realist Internationalism, 2006-2011. In H. Smith and C. Turenne Sjolander, eds. *Canada in the World – Internationalism in Canadian Foreign Policy*, Toronto: Oxford University Press: 53-70.

Boucher, J.C. 2010. Evaluating the “Trenton Effect”: Canadian Public Opinion and Military Casualties in Afghanistan (2006-2010). *American Review of Canadian Studies*, volume 40, issue 2: 237-258.

Canadian Election Survey. 2017. Surveys. Available at <http://ces-ec.arts.ubc.ca/english-section/surveys/>

Dorn, W. 2005. Canadian Peacekeeping: Proud Tradition, Strong Future?. *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal*, volume 12, issue 2: 7-32.

Forum Research. 2016. One half approve of Mideast mission reset. Press release, February 18 2016, available at <http://poll.forumresearch.com/post/2461/one-half-prefer-a-non-combat-role/>

Harris Decima. 2010. Majority Oppose Sending Combat Troops to Mali. Press release, February 8 2013.

Ipsos. 2015. In Wake of Paris Terror Attacks, Six in Ten (60%) Canadians Oppose Government's Plan to Settle 25,000 Refugees by End of Year. Press release, November 21 2015, available at <https://www.ipsos.com/en-ca/wake-paris-terror-attacks-six-ten-60-canadians-oppose-governments-plan-settle-25000-refugees-end>

Jackson, Paul. 2011. Security Sector Reform and State Building. *Third World Quarterly*, volume 32, issue 10: 1803-1822.

Kreps, S. 2010. Elite Consensus as a Determinant of Alliance Cohesion: Why Public Opinion Hardly Matters for NATO-led Operations in Afghanistan. *Foreign Policy Analysis*, volume 6, issue 3: 191-215.

Landriault, M. 2016. Does Voting End at the Water's Edge? Canadian Public Opinion and Voter Intentions, 2006-2015. *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal*, volume 22, issue 3; 249-261.

Martin, P. and Fortmann, M. 1995. Canadian public opinion and peacekeeping in a turbulent world. *International Journal*, volume 50, issue 2: 370-400.

Massie, J. and Roussel S. 2013. The Twilight of Internationalism? Neocontinentalism as an Emerging Dominant Idea in Canadian Foreign Policy. In H. Smith and C. Turenne Sjolander, eds. *Canada in the World – Internationalism in Canadian Foreign Policy*, Toronto: Oxford University Press: 36-52.

Murray, R. and McCoy, J. 2010. From Middle Power to Peacebuilder: The Use of the Canadian Forces in Modern Canadian Foreign Policy. *American Review of Canadian Studies*, volume 40, issue 2: 171-188.

Nanos Research. 2016. Views on Canada's role in peacekeeping missions. Press release, October 2016, available at <http://www.nanosresearch.com/sites/default/files/POLNAT-S15-T703.pdf>

Nossal, K.R. 2013. The Liberal Past in the Conservative Present: Internationalism in the Harper Era. In H. Smith and C. Turenne Sjolander, eds. *Canada in the World – Internationalism In Canadian Foreign Policy*, Toronto: Oxford University Press: 21-35.

Paris, R. 2014. Are Canadians still liberal internationalists? Foreign policy and public opinion in the Harper era. *International Journal*, volume 69, issue 3: 274-307.

Ringmose, J. and Borgesen, B. 2011. Shaping public attitudes towards the deployment of military power: NATO, Afghanistan and the use of strategic narratives. *European Security*, volume 20, issue 4: p.505-528.

Roussel, S. and Boucher, J.C. 2008. The Myth of the Pacific Society: Quebec's Contemporary Strategic Culture. *American Review of Canadian Studies*, volume 38, issue 2: 165-187.

Staring S. 2013. Harper's history. *Policy Options*, volume 34, issue 2: 42-48.